Capturing the case of Parade Tauhid in Indonesia, this paper aims to describe embodied relationship between religion (Islam) and politics. As part of social action, Islamic activism provides variety of contention which is practiced in the name of "Islam": ideologically, structurally, and purposely. Within his explanation of communicative action theory, Habermas acknowledges what so-called as "strategic action" which can be defined as every action oriented to success under the aspect of rational choice and assess the efficacy of influencing decisions or positions of rational opponent. In this context, Parade Tauhid is perceived to be conducted for reaching several political and theological purposes based on rational choices, although it is practiced by performing religious event. This paper attempts to describe definition of Islamic activism, explore the event of Parade Tauhid, and analyze the parade using Habermas's theory of strategic action.
Introduction
Indonesia is neither secular nor Islamic state. It constitutes its own basic principle renowned as Pancasila (the five pillars) which is based on religiosity, humanity and social justice. The founders of the Republic of Indonesia strove to accommodate plurality and diversity (ethnicity, religion,
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State Islamic University Sunan Ampel Surabaya shidiq987@yahoo.com 32 Akhmad Siddiq culture, etc.) into the very basic norm of nation-state. It was symbolized in the national refrain, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity). However, Indonesia is celebrated as Moslem-majority-state that grasps people to look at Islam as its "religious identity". More than 80 percent of Indonesia's population is Moslems (Suryadinata 2000; Indiyanto 2013 ). Some Moslem intellectuals, for instance Fazlur Rahman, suppose that Islamic resurgence will rise from this country. Eventually, Moslems-as the majority-tend to propose Islamic values to become practical reason, referring to Pierre Bourdieu (1980) , in practicing everyday manners, specifically politics. This effort may be called as "Moslem Politics".
Moslem Politics, according to Eickelmen and Piscatori (1996, 5) , is "the competition and contest over both the interpretation and symbols and the control of the institution, both formal and informal that produce and sustain them." It shares and plays what so-called "sacred authority" as main ground for interpreting and legitimating text and context. Moslem politics represents itself through many activities and institutions which "promote" particular understanding of political and social role of Islam.
In this context, we can see how Islamic values are being implemented (or say attempt to be applied) within the rational political and social publicness (Habermas 2002 , Calhoun 2013 ).
In his book, Why Politics Needs Religion: The Place of Religious Arguments in the Public Square, Sweetman (2006) insists that all religions have a right to involve into social and political considerations. He argues that modern pluralism is not threatened or harmed by allowing religious argumentation.
In the contrary, it is reinforced. Sweetman explains that every rationale and worldview has a sincere sphere in the democratic practices. Religious and non-religious positions have same position to promote their unique prepositions. According to him, religion-as a worldview-is a philosophy of life. It deals with the nature of reality, what it means to be human, and how we think about right and wrong.
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In line with this rational use of religion in the public, Habermas (2008, 120) analyzes Habermas' changing perspective of religion and its relation with the public sphere. Although he insisted that the change in Habermas' view of religion is not significant because he still denies the "publicness" of religion, but it exposed that there is, and will always be, deep connection between religion and public sphere, public policy (Meyer, 1995: 371-391) . Akhmad Siddiq (Eickelmen and Piscatori, 1996) and "Islamic activism" (Wiktorowicz, 2004) have epistemologically deep connection and strong academic nexus.
Islamic activism mostly stems from imaginary of "Islam" as system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action. Wiktorowicz (2004, 6) explains that Islamic activism is part of social movement that emerges at least because of two reasons. First is structural and psychological cause.
This perspective believes in "linier causal relationship in which structural strains produce psychological discomfort, which, in turn, produce collective action." Second, political strain which assumes that lack of political access mitigates modernization project and alleviate quality of life. It drives pathologically societal frustration and sense of alienation.
In some cases, the means of the second condition is natural and cultural struggle of Islamic activism. It uses more religious conciliation against political exclusion (Wiktorowicz 2004, 8) . (Minkenberg 2002, 221-247) .
The same thing arises here in Indonesia. Islamic activism uses political policies as an instrument to express its goal as well as be used by political goal to initiate policy. To figure out the current issue of politics what so-called as Islamic movement in Indonesia. It may be placed into a discussion on how "Moslem Politics" deal with the political manners. It shows us that even the "radical" Moslem movement do not ignore politics (as a tool) to reach their persistence and use "publicness" to grasp it. Using
Habermas' theory of strategic action, this parade was directed to reach purposive goal, specifically theological and political ends.
Strategic Action
It is renowned that Habermas (1984, 282) constructed his theory of communicative action based on the action theory of Max Weber. Although he criticized Weber's action theory that it "does not take into account the principled character on the basis of which the Protestant ethic, for example, qualifies as a framework for a methodical conduct of life", he asserts that the theory of communicative action is a persistence of Weber's theory.
Understanding the theory of communicative action requires understanding of Weber's action theory, especially relational concept of action and rationality. Weber wrote:
Like every action, social action too can be determined (1) purposiverationally-through expectations as to the behavior of objects in the external
Akhmad Siddiq world and of other men, using these expectations as "conditions" or as "means" for one's own ends, weighed and pursued rationally in terms of success; (2) value-rationally-through conscious belief in the (ethical, aesthetic, religious or however interpreted) unconditional, intrinsic value of a certain mode of behavior, purely as such and independently of success; (3) affectually, especially emotionally-through present affects and emotional states; (4) traditionally-through the habituation of long practice (Habermas 1984,281 ).
Habermas simplified this typology to the formal properties of purposive-rational action. The main focus of this typology is acting subject and its consideration. In semiotic tradition on speech act theory,
Habermas often mentioned it in the term of "speaker" and "hearer".
Habermas ( Continuing the theory of Weber, Habermas (1984, 282) explored that "social actions can be distinguished according to the mechanisms for coordinating individual actions, for instance according to whether a social relation is based on interest positions alone or on normative agreement as well." Here, we can see that Habermas' focus on theorizing social action is purposive orientation. According to him, social actions can be distinguished according to whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to reaching understanding (Habermas 1984, 286) .
In doing so, he explains two typology of social action: communicative action and strategic action. Each has its own purpose. Strategic action is based on orientation to success, while communicative action is based on reaching understanding. See the figure below: Based on this explanation, we can conclude that strategic action is a rational choice deliberated to influence other's decision or position. As
Habermas wrote, "we call an action oriented to success strategic when we consider it under the aspect of following rules of rational choice and assess the efficacy of influencing the decisions of a rational opponent" (Habermas 1984, 285) . In more detail, Habermas explains deliberations of strategic action into concealed strategic action and open strategic action, and concealed strategic action can be divided into conscious deception The action is intended to reach some theological and political ends (strategic action) and not to grasp mutual understanding (communicative action). It is to reinforce "one world", the same understanding, and not to make a mutual understanding. Referring to Habermas theory, we can assume it as a concealed strategic action that is proposed to extend a certain goal. The speakers force the readers by using Islamic activism to 
